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critical problem of bombings in public facilities.14 1 Nevertheless, it
is submitted that the court has taken a dangerous step toward cur-
tailment of an individual's rights in addressing this concern.
Rather than risk sacrificing these rights,1 42 it is suggested that the
court should encourage a uniform, minimally intrusive search at
the courthouse entrance whenever court is in session as an alterna-
tive to the type of search sustained in Alba.145
Caren L. Samplin
Pending Seider attachments survive Rush decision when defen-
dant had not raised jurisdictional defect with sufficient particu-
larity to apprise plaintiff of quasi-in-rem nature of objection
After the Seider doctrine144 was declared unconstitutional in
141 See 81 App. Div. 2d at 352-53, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 234-35.
"42 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 452, 201
N.E.2d 32, 39, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 468 (1964) (Fuld, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978
(1965). See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1968). In Brinegar, Justice Jackson
recognized the difficulty of protecting fourth amendment rights. 338 U.S. at 181 (Jackson,
J., dissenting). He noted that many unlawful searches are never scrutinized by courts be-
cause of the absence of incriminating evidence. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting). Therefore, Jus-
tice Jackson concluded that courts must often exclude evidence seized from guilty defen-
dants in. order to .protect the innocent against future unconstitutional invasions. Id.
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
143 It has been noted that despite the threat posed by public dangers, modifications in
constitutional principles should be approached with caution. See Jesmore, The Courthouse
Search, 21 U.C.LA. L. Rzv. 797, 799 (1974). The increased threat of violence in courthouses
and other federal buildings has resulted in the implementation of limited searches at the
entrances to many federal facilities. See id. at 799, 809. The constitutionality of regulations
requiring searches of all packages carried by individuals into such buildings has been up-
held. See, e.g., Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1232-33 (6th Cir. 1972). The immediate
danger to property and persons is said to justify these minimally intrusive searches. Id.; see
McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1978). It is suggested that if such a proce-
dure had been employed at the Bronx courthouse whenever court was in session, the issues
involved in Alba never would have arisen. Indeed, it seems that the danger would have been
averted, and the defendant's constitutional rights would not have been affected.
144 Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The Seider
doctrine provided that when a defendant had procured liability insurance with a New York
insurer doing business within the state, the insurer's obligation to indemnify would be
viewed as an attachable debt upon which jurisdiction could be predicated. Id. at 114-15, 216
N.E.2d at 314-15, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02. See generally Carpenter, New York's Expanding
Empire in Tort Jurisdiction? Quo vadis?, 22 HASTMNGs L.J. 1173, 1180-83 (1971); Stein, Ju-
risdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 1075, 1105, 1116-17,
1135-36 (1968). CPLR 5201(a) defines an attachable debt as one "which is past due or which
is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor." CPLR 5201(a)
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Rush v. Savchuk,1 5 New York courts were confronted with the dif-
ficult question of how to apply the ruling to pending cases.146 Al-
though the decision was premised upon constitutional grounds
which mandated retroactive application, the application of the de-
cision to pending cases appeared to work an injustice towards
plaintiffs who, having instituted their actions in New York in reli-
ance upon New York's tolerance of the doctrine, 47 were time-
barred in other jurisdictions. These litigants faced the prospect of
dismissal when jurisdictional objections had been raised. Recently,
however, in Gager v. White,14 8 the Court of Appeals preserved
(1978). See generally 7A WK&M 6202.01.
245 444 U.S. 320 (1980). In Rush, the Court examined the Seider doctrine and found
that it failed to satisfy the test of minimum contacts, id. at 332-33, first enunciated in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). This test mandates the existence
of a relationship between the forum state, the controversy, and the defendant before the
state properly may exercise jurisdiction. The scope of the test subsequently was expanded to
include the evaluation of quasi-in-rem actions. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
In light of the minimum contacts requirement, the Supreme Court, in deciding Rush, found
that the Seider defendant had no "judicially cognizable ties" with the forum state. 444 U.S.
at 332. The Court also noted that "the Due Process Clause 'does not contemplate that a
state may make binding a judgment ... against [a] defendant with which the state has no
contacts."' 440 U.S. at 332-33 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
319 (1945)).
148 The Court of Appeals applied Rush retroactively in Erneta v. Princeton Hosp., 49
N.Y.2d 829, 830, 404 N.E.2d 1335, 1335, 427 N.Y.S.2d 794, 794 (1980). After the Erneta
decision, however, there existed some uncertainty as to whether the retroactive application
of the Rush principle should be limited to instances wherein the plaintiff's cause of action
was not time-barred in all proper jurisdictions. Kalman v. Neuman, 80 App. Div. 2d 116,
122-23, 438 N.Y.S.2d 109, 113-14 (2d Dep't 1981); see also Siegel, Seider-Overruling Up-
date, 257 N.Y. ST. L. DIG. (May 1981) [hereinafter cited as Update]. Nonetheless, in most
instances, it appears that Rush has been applied retroactively. See, e.g., Hill v. Elliott, 79
App. Div. 2d 559, 559, 437 N.Y.S.2d 916, 916 (1st Dep't 1980), affld, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 425
N.E.2d 851, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1981); Gager v. White, 78 App. Div. 2d 617, 617, 432
N.Y.S.2d 388, 388 (1st Dep't 1980), aft'd, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 425 N.E.2d 851, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463
(1981).
4 Although controversial from its inception, the constitutionality of the Seider doc-
trine was reaffirmed repeatedly by the New York Court of Appeals, see, e.g., Simpson v.
Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1967). Prior to
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977), the Seider doctrine had also drawn support
from the United States Supreme Court. See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Victor, 393 U.S. 7 (1968)
(appeal of Seider action dismissed for "want of a substantial federal question"). After Shaf-
fer extended the minimum contacts test to include quasi-in-rem actions, see note 145 supra,
speculation arose that such contacts were lacking in the Seider process. See, e.g., SIEGMr §
105, at 127 ("It may well be that the... Shaffer decision ... precludes further use of the
Seider doctrine."); Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 15,
21 (1978); McLaughlin, Seider v. Roth-Dead or Alive?, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 1,
at 24, col. 3.
148 53 N.Y.2d 475, 425 N.E.2d 851, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1981).
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some Seider claims by holding that unless a defendant's objections
had been stated with sufficient particularity to apprise the plaintiff
of the quasi-in-rem nature of the objection, the defendant would
be deemed to have waived his objection under CPLR 3211.149
In Gager, the court consolidated five Seider cases commenced
before the Rush decision. Of the five defendants, two had pre-
sented timely objections to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, two had
made timely objections to "personal jurisdiction," and the fifth
had not raised a timely jurisdictional objection. 50 Without distin-
guishing between objections to in rem and in personam jurisdic-
tion," 1 the Appellate Division, First Department, dismissed each
of the four cases in which a timely objection to jurisdiction had
been lodged,15s reasoning that since Rush had abolished the con-
cept that the defendant was fictionally present within the state,
there was no "defendant against whom further proceedings [could]
be continued."'5 s The court retained jurisdiction of the case in
.49 53 N.Y.2d at 489, 425 N.E.2d at 857, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 469. Specificity of pleading in
New York is generally governed by CPLR 3013 which requires that pleadings "be suffi-
ciently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or
series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of
each cause of action or defense." CPLR 3013 (1974). This section represents a liberalization
of prior law, see 3 WK&M 3013.01, and was intended to save time and expense. See Foly
v. D'Agostino, 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 63, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dep't 1964). Due to the
threshold nature of jurisdictional issues, however, as well as the time and expense involved
in proceeding with litigation without immediately raising a jurisdictional issue dispositive of
the case, strict requirements as to timeliness and specificity were written into the CPLR for
jurisdictional motions. See Competello v. Giordano, 51 N.Y.2d 904, 905, 415 N.E.2d 965,
965, 434 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (1980). See generally Homburger & Laufer, Appearance and
Jurisdictional Motions in New York, 14 BUFFALo L. REv. 374, 378-87 (1964).
10 53 N.Y.2d at 488-89, 425 N.E.2d at 857, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
151 CPLR 3211 provides distinct motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
(3211(a)(8)) and in rem jurisdiction (3211(a)(9)). Although research reveals no other cases
holding that a 3211(a) (8) motion is sufficient to raise a quasi-in-rem jurisdictional objection,
the dangers inherent in moving under only one section are well documented. See, e.g.,
SIEGEL § 267, at 326; 4 WK&M T 3211.15, at 32-67; Homburger & Laufer, supra note 149, at
386-87.
151 Hill v. Elliot, 79 App. Div. 2d 559, 559, 437 N.Y.S.2d 916, 916 (1st Dep't 1980), afl'd
sub nom. Gager v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 425 N.E.2d 851, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1981); Carbone
v. Ericson, 79 App. Div. 2d 551, 551, 433 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807 (1st Dep't 1980), rev'd sub nom.
Gager v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 425 N.E.2d 851, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1981); Mei Yuet Chin v.
Cray, 78 App. Div. 2d 821, 821, 434 N.Y.S.2d 650, 650 (1st Dep't 1980), rev'd sub nom. 53
N.Y.2d 475, 425 N.E.2d 851, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1981); Gager v. White, 78 App. Div. 2d 617,
617, 432 N.Y.S.2d 388, 388 (1st Dep't 1980), aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 425 N.E.2d 851, 442
N.Y.S.2d 463 (1981).
153 Gager v. White, 78 App. Div. 2d 617, 617, 432 N.Y.S.2d 388, 388 (1st Dep't 1980),
afl'd, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 425 N.E.2d 851, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1981).
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which no jurisdictional objections had been raised.'"
On appeal, the Court of Appeals applied Rush retroactively,
reasoning that a mere prospective application of the decision
would amount to a continuing violation of the Seider defendant's
due process rights.155 Writing for the majority,"s Judge Fuchsberg
affirmed the dismissals in those cases where specific and timely ob-
jections to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction had been raised.157 After dis-
posing of the retroactivity question,"5 ' the Court addressed the is-
sue whether a defendant's objection to "personal jurisdiction"
should be considered sufficient to preserve an objection based upon
the failure of minimum contacts in a quasi-in-rem action. 59 Rely-
ing on the categorical distinctions set forth in the jurisdictional
pleading requirements of CPLR 3211(a)(8) and (9),10 the Gager
154 Cachat v. Guertin Co., 79 App. Div. 2d 549, 549, 437 N.Y.S.2d 915, 915 (1st Dep't
1980), aff'd sub nom. Gager v. White, 53 N Y.2d 475, 425 N.E.2d 851, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463
(1981).
-5 53 N.Y.2d at 487, 425 N.E.2d at 856, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
151 Joining Judge Fuchsberg in the majority opinion were Chief Judge Cooke and
Judges Jasen and Meyer. Judges Gabrielli, Jones, and Wachtler concurred in a separate
opinion.
.57 53 N.Y.2d at 488, 425 N.E.2d at 857, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
"I" Id. at 487, 425 N.E.2d at 856, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 468. In their concurring opinion,
Judges Gabrielli, Jones and Wachtler criticized the majority's approach for "overbreadth."
Id. at 490, 425 N.E.2d at 857, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 469 (Gabrielli, Jones and Wachtler, JJ., con-
curring). Noting that the propriety of applying Rush retroactively had been established in
Erneta v. Princeton Hosp., 49 N.Y.2d 829, 830, 404 N.E.2d 1335, 1335, 427 N.Y.S.2d 794,
794 (1980), see note 146 supra, the concurring judges believed that the only issue presented
in Gager was whether a mere objection to "in personam" jurisdiction constituted a waiver of
the "quasi-in-rem" issue. 53 N.Y.2d at 490, 425 N.E.2d at 858, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 470
(Gabrielli, Jones and Wachtler, JJ., concurring).
159 53 N.Y.2d at 489, 425 N.E.2d at 857, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 469. When a timely objection
is made under CPLR 3211(a)(8) or (9), the objection to jurisdiction will be preserved
throughout the appeals process. See generally 4 WK&M 1 3211.04-.05. In Gager, the Court
acknowledged that the objections would be preserved when the defendant had pleaded his
objection with sufficient particularity. 53 N.Y.2d at 489, 425 N.E.2d at 857, 442 N.Y.S.2d at
469.
'60 CPLR 3211 states in part:
(a) Motion to dismiss cause of action. A party may move for judgment dismissing
one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that
8. the court has not jurisdiction of the person of the defendant; or
9. the court has not jurisdiction in an action where service was made under section
314 [attachment] or 315.
(e) An objection based upon a ground specified in paragraphs eight or nine of
subdivision (a) is waived if a party moves on any of the grounds set forth in subdi-
vision (a) without raising such objection or if, having made no objection under
subdivision (a), he does not raise such objection in the responsive pleading.
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Court held that an objection to "personal jurisdiction" was not suf-
ficiently particular to apprise the plaintiff of the quasi-in-rem na-
ture of the objection. The defendants, therefore, were deemed to
have waived their jurisdictional objections161 and voluntarily sub-
mitted to the jurisdiction of the New York court.162
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals, while recognizing
the inequities facing potentially time-barred plaintiffs, 6 s properly
held that a retroactive application of Rush was mandated." The
Gager Court's opinion indicates that when objections to jurisdic-
tion are properly based upon fundamental constitutional consider-
ations,16 5 the Court will be powerless to adjudicate any pending
CPLR 3211(a)(8)(a) (1970).
"' The majority reasoned that "[s]ince . . . a defect in the categorically distinct con-
cept of quasi in rem jurisdiction requires a sufficiently particularized pleading to apprise the
plaintiff of its nature with sufficient clarity to avoid prejudice by inducing quiescence.. . it
follows that the in rem issue must be deemed waived." 53 N.Y.2d at 489, 425 N.E.2d at 857,
442 N.Y.S.2d at 469 (citations omitted). The concurring judges agreed that the "defendant
must be explicit, by a 'sufficiently particularized pleading"' and that it would not suffice to
"raise challenges to personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Id. at 490-91, 425 N.E.2d at
858, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 470 (Gabrielli, Jones and Wachtler, JJ., concurring).
162 Id. at 488-89, 425 N.E.2d at 856-57, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69. The Court noted that
the defendant's voluntary appearance in an action in and of itself provides a predicate for
jurisdiction in the New York court. Id. at 488, 425 N.E.2d at 856, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 468.16 The Gager Court recognized that the now forumless plaintiffs had chosen "to rely on
the authoritative pronouncements of the New York courts," which had upheld Seider juris-
diction. Id. at 484, 425 N.E.2d at 854, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 466. Most significantly, the Seider
process had been measured against the Shaffer standard by both the New York Court of
Appeals, see Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 891, 383 N.E.2d 110, 111, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808,
809 (1978), and the Second Circuit, see O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194,
200-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978), and found constitutionally sound. Thus,
it is suggested that the plaintiffs were justified in relying upon Seider in bringing their
actions in New York. See Update, supra note 146.
1'4 The Court applied Rush retroactively despite the plaintiffs' contention that a retro-
active application would be improper. 53 N.Y.2d at 484, 425 N.E.2d at 854, 442 N.Y.S.2d at
466. The plaintiffs argued that the "Sunburst Doctrine" was applicable to their case. Id.; see
Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). This doctrine permits a
court to apply the existing state law to the case at bar while overruling the law prospec-
tively. Id. at 364. The doctrine, however, does not permit the continued application of law
which is repugnant to the Constitution. Id. at 363. Thus, the "Sunburst Doctrine" could not
be employed in Gager, wherein a refusal to apply Rush retroactively would have been tanta-
mount to an unconstitutional assertion of jurisdiction over the defendants. See generally
Rogers, Perspectives on Prospective Overruling, 36 U.M.K.C. L. Rav. 35, 43-44 (1968).
165 The Rush decision viewed the exercise of Seider jurisdiction as a violation of due
process. 444 U.S. at 332-33. The Gager Court in turn recognized that "a constitutional due
process limitation on the power of a State's exercise of its jurisdiction under our Federal
system of government ... is an absolute abnegation of the offending State's ability to con-
tinue to act beyond the boundaries the determination defines." 53 N.Y.2d at 484, 455
N.E.2d at 854, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 466; see note 164 supra. Compare Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S.
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claims. Nevertheless, the Court circumvented the constitutional is-
sue and acknowledged jurisdiction over two defendants by holding
that the defendants had waived their jurisdictional defenses by
their failure to specifically raise the quasi-in-rem issue as required
by CPLR 3211.166
The Gager decision illustrates a strict application of CPLR
3211. Viewed in light of the statutory requirements, the decision
complies with the letter of existing law. 167 It is submitted, however,
that the obsolete distinctions inherent in CPLR 3211 prevented
the Court from adopting a more progressive view of the actual re-
quirements for jurisdiction.6 8 Under the guidelines of this section,
the defendant is compelled to acknowledge distinctions between in
personam and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction which no longer appear to
have a substantive basis."' Indeed, the gap between the two types
320, 332-33 (1980) (fundamental due process violation) with Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil &
Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932) (denial of retroactive application constitutional where law
applied at trial was inoffensive to the Constitution).
16 53 N.Y.2d at 489, 425 N.E.2d at 857, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 469. Since the Rush decision
did not determine that Seider was unconstitutional until after the 3211 motions had been
made, it can be argued that the defendants relinguished an unknown right. Such an inter-
pretation is contrary to the very definition of waiver. McLaughlin, Seider v. Roth-Farewell
to Alms, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 1980, at 2, coL2.
167 See note 160 and accompanying text supra.
' From the time of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), to the time of Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the presence of property within a state was enough to submit
the interests of a person in that property to the jurisdiction of the state. See generally
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 33, 44-53 (1978). Shaf-
fer recognized that an assertion of jurisdiction over the interests of a person in property was
essentially an assertion of jurisdiction over that person and, therefore, the same "minimum
contacts" test should govern regardless of whether property of the defendant has been at-
tached. See note 145 supra. CPLR 3211, formulated before Shaffer was decided, continues
to treat the jurisdictional requirements of the actions as though they were distinct.
,e9 Notably, although there is no longer a distinction between the threshold constitu-
tional requirements for the exercise of either in personam or quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, real
differences still exist in both the scope of permissible recovery and the rules of procedure
applicable to each type of action. For example, in a quasi-in-rem action in a state such as
New York which provides for a limited appearance, see CPLR 320(c)(1) (1972), the scope of
the defendant's recovery will be limited to the property attached. See generally SEmGEL §
113, at 140-41. No such limitation adheres in an in personam action. Id. A further distinc-
tion stems from the fact that although both in rem and in personam jurisdiction must ad-
here to identical guidelines, the individual state is not required to exercise all the jurisdic-
tion constitutionally available and can set standards more stringent than those required by
the Constitution. Compare CPLR 302 (1972) (specific situations in which New York may
exercise long-arm jurisdiction) with CAL. CIrv. Paoc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) ("[a] court
of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or of the United States"). Therefore, it is possible for a factual situation to arise in
which long-arm jurisdiction, while constitutionally permissible, would not be available under
the forum state's long-arm statute. In that instance, if the prospective defendant had prop-
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of jurisdiction has been bridged by recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements which have applied the "minimum contacts" require-
ment to both in personam and in rem actions.70 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that it is a fiction to allege that
"jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdic-
tion over the owner of the property. 1 7 1 It seems, therefore, that a
defendant's objection to personal jurisdiction should preserve his
minimum contacts objection.17 2
In light of the Gager decision, the practitioner should be wary
when dealing with CPLR 3211(a)(8) and (9). If any doubts exist as
to whether an action falls within the in personam or in rem provi-
sion both objections should be raised. Furthermore, it appears that
the Supreme Court's proclamation that "all assertions of state
court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set
forth in International Shoe,"1 7  has rendered meaningless the dis-
tinction between CPLR 3211(a)(8) and (9). Therefore, it is hoped
that the legislature will formulate a statute whereby the defendant
may make a single jurisdictional objection based upon a failure of
erty within the forum state, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction would not be precluded. See Leathers,
The First Two Years After Shaffer v. Heitner, 40 LA. L. REV. 907, 909 (1980); Murchison,
Jurisdiction Over Persons, Things and Status, 41 LA. L. REv. 1053, 1159 (1981). It would
seem useful, therefore, for CPLR 3211 to provide an objection to improper attachment unre-
lated to the proposed "minimum contacts" objection.
170 See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328 (1980). It should be noted that al-
though the Supreme Court has stated that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny," Shaf-
fer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977), speculation has arisen that quasi-in-rem actions
require a lesser degree of contacts to satisfy International Shoe than do in personam ac-
tions. See, e.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017, 1022-23 (2d Cir.
1978). See generally Silberman, supra note 168, at 71-72. The proper view seems to be that
although property within a state can constitute a contact, the presence of property does not,
in and of itself, dilute the requirements of International Shoe. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. at 209.
171 433 U.S. at 212.
172 Shaffer, upon which stands Rush, held that because jurisdiction over a person's in-
terest is truly jurisdiction over the person, quasi-in-rem actions are to be evaluated accord-
ing to the standards used to evaluate personal jurisdiction. 433 U.S. at 212. Thus, it appears
that with respect to the Constitution, state court assertions of jurisdiction are all in per-
sonam. See note 168 supra. Moreover, it is submitted that regardless of whatever other
differences between the two actions may inhere, see note 169 supra, an objection based
upon Rush is fundamentally an objection that the forum state does not have jurisdiction
over the defendant's person. This view, however, does not appear entirely consistent with
the Gager holding that an objection to personal jurisdiction is not sufficiently particular to
apprise the plaintiff of an objection based upon Rush. 53 N.Y.2d at 489, 455 N.E.2d at 857,
442 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
173 433 U.S. at 212.
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minimum contacts regardless of whether any property of the de-
fendant has been attached. Of course, separate objections would
still be appropriate when failure of service or improper attachment
is alleged. 17 4 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the proposed change
would lend consistency to jurisdictional pleading under the CPLR.
Richard H. Metsch
Relationship between premium finance agency and insurance
company is not sufficient to sustain a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation
The negligent misrepresentation cause of action permits recov-
ery for injuries arising out of justifiable reliance upon careless,
though innocent, statements.17 5 Although the cause of action read-
"" An objection to an attachment procedure, on grounds other than a failure of mini-
mum contacts among the forum, defendant and controversy, would seem warranted because
actual distinctions between quasi-in-rem and in personam actions still exist. See note 169
supra.
1, New York first recognized a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation in
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). In Glanzer, the plaintiff entered into
an agreement to buy beans "in accordance with weight sheets certified by [the defendant]
public weighers," employed by the seller. Id. at 238, 135 N.E. at 275. The plaintiffs paid for
the goods in reliance upon the certified weight measures, which proved to be inaccurate, and
sought to recover the overpayment from the public weighers. Id. Judge Cardozo, writing for
the majority, overcame the restrictions of privity and reasoned that when one acts pursuant
to an independent calling to control the conduct of another, the duty to act with care will
extend to "all whose conduct was to be governed," even if acting gratuitously. Id. at 239, 135
N.E. at 276.
Although the Court upheld the recovery "not merely for careless words ... but for the
careless performance of a service," id. at 241, 135 N.E. at 276 (citations omitted), the only
evidence of negligence was the inaccurate certificate itself, id.; see Green, The Communica-
tive Torts, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35 (1975), and, therefore, Glanzer is still considered the lead-
ing case on negligent misrepresentation. Note, Negligent Misrepresentation: Can an Attor-
ney Rely on What the Government Tells Him?, 40 LA. L. REv. 859, 860-63 (1980); see, e.g.,
White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 362, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474, 478 (1977);
Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat'l Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 377-78, 171 N.E. 574, 577-78 (1930);
Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y. 377, 381, 157 N.E.
272, 273-74 (1927). In addition, Glanzer provided the basis for section 552 of the Second
Restatement of Torts on negligent misrepresentation. Green, supra, at 35. Under the Re-
statement, a person is liable for negligent misrepresentation if, "in the course of his business
- . . [he] supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions
... [and] he fails to exercise reasonable care." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 552(1)
(1976). The Restatement differs from Glanzer only in that the former will not impose a duty
when the person is acting gratuitously. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) comment
c (1976); But see Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276 (1922) ("[i]t is an-
cient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become
